The so-called "non-commutativity" of probability kinematics has caused much unjustified concern. When identical learning is properly represented, namely, by identical Bayes factors rather than identical posterior probabilities, then sequential probability-kinematical revisions behave just as they should. Our analysis is based on a variant of Field's reformulation of probability kinematics, divested of its (inessential) physicalist gloss.
Introduction
The much remarked "non-commutativity" of probability kinematics ( Domotor 1982, Skyrms 1986 , van Fraassen 1989 , Döring 1999 , Lange 2000 has evoked varying degrees of concern. In this paper it is shown that when identical learning is properly represented, namely, by identical Bayes factors rather than identical posterior probabilities, then sequential probability-kinematical revisions behave just as they should.
Our analysis, which unifies and extends results in Field 1978 , Diaconis and Zabell 1982, and Jeffrey 1988 , is based on a variant of Field's reformulation of probability kinematics, divested of its (inessential) physicalist gloss. In § 2 a brief review of probability kinematics is presented. In § 3 we extend Field's Theorem to countable partitions, showing that the uniformity of Bayes factors in the representation of identical learning is sufficient for the commutativity of probability kinematics. In § 4 it is shown that under mild restrictions such uniformity is also necessary for commutativity. In § 5 we discuss the methodological and philosophical implications of these theorems.
The notational conventions of this paper are as follows: If q is a revision of the probability measure p and A and B are events, the Bayes factor (or odds factor) β q,p (A : B) is the ratio 
Probability Kinematics
Let (Ω, A, p) be a probability space, and suppose that E = {E i } is a countable family of pairwise disjoint events, with p(E i ) > 0 for all i. A probability measure q is said to come from p by probability kinematics on E (Jeffrey 1965 (Jeffrey , 1983 ) if there exists a sequence (e i ) of positive real numbers summing to one, such that
, and so probability kinematics is a generalization of ordinary conditionalization. Formula (2.1) is clearly equivalent to the conjunction of the conditions Having revised p to q by the probability-kinematical formula (2.1) above, let us consider a subsequent revision of q to r by the formula
where F = {F j } is a countable family of pairwise disjoint events such that q(F j ) > 0 for all j, and (f j ) is a sequence of positive real numbers summing to one. Now imagine reversing the order of the foregoing, first revising p to, say, q by the formula
for all A ∈ A, (2.5) and then revising q to, say, r by the formula
Unless E = {E} and F = {F }, in which case r (A) = r(A) = p(A|EF ), it may well be the case that r = r. The possibility of such "non-commutativity" has been the source of much confusion and unjustified concern. In the next two sections we lay the foundations for clarifying this issue with two theorems, delineating their methodological and philosophical implications in §5.
Field's Theorem
A proper analysis of the commutativity issue requires consideration of the more general probability-kinematical revision schema
where the sequence r (E i ) may differ from q(E i ) , and the sequence q (F j ) from r(F j ) . Field (1978) was the first to identify conditions sufficient to ensure that r = r in this setting, in the special case where E and F are finite. In fact, Field's result holds for all countable families E and F, but requires a different proof. 
hold, then r = r.
Proof. It follows from (2.1) and (2.2) that for all
Dividing the numerator and denominator of the right-hand side of (3.4) by q(E 1 )/p(E 1 ), and setting A = Ω, then yields the formula (3.5) where
With B i := β r ,q (E i : E 1 ), b j := β r,q (F j : F 1 ), and b j := β q ,p (F j : F 1 ), it follows from (3.5), along with analogous formulas for r, q , and r that
and 
where G i is the geometric mean
Remark 3.2. By (1.3), the Bayes factor identities (3.2) and (3.3) are equivalent, respectively, to the probability factor proportionalities Jeffrey (1988) showed that if E and F are finite and r and r are defined by (3.1), then the probability factor identities
imply that r = r. In light of the above remark, Jeffrey's result is a corollary of Theorem 3.1.
In the special case of schema (3.1) represented by (2.7), Bayes factor and probability factor identities are equivalent to each other, as well as to an especially salient pair of conditions known as Jeffrey-independence conditions, namely,
for all i, and .7), with E and F finite, that conditions (3.15) and (3.16) imply that r = r . In view of Theorem 3.2, this result is also a corollary of Theorem 3.1. Note that the p-independence of E and
Remark 3.5. Formula (3.7), and consequently Theorem 3.1, can be generalized to arbitrary finite sequences of probability-kinematical revisions. We leave the details as an exercise for interested readers.
A Partial Converse of Field's Theorem
The Bayes factor identities (3.2) and (3.3) are not in general necessary for r and r in the revision schema (3.1) to coincide. For example, if F = E = {E i } and r(E i ) = r (E i ) for all i, then r = r, no matter what values are assigned to q(E i ) and q (E i ). However, Field's Theorem does admit of a partial converse.
To motivate the statement of conditions under which (3.2) and (3.3) are necessary for commutativity, it is useful to reiterate the conditions under which the probabilities in schema (3.1) are well-defined. In order to implement the formulas for q, q , r, and r , we must have, respectively, p(E i ) > 0, p(F j ) > 0, q(F j ) > 0, and q (E i ) > 0, for all i and j, or, equivalently, that
The identities (3.2) and (3.3) turn out to be necessary for commutativity under a mild strengthening of the well-definedness conditions (4.1) and (4.2).
Theorem 4.1. Let r and r be defined by the probability revision schema (3.1), and suppose that
If r = r, then the Bayes factor identities (3.2) and (3.3) hold.
Proof. Since q comes from p by probability kinematics on E, the rigidity condition (2.3) implies that
for all i, j, and (4.9)
Given arbitrary i 1 and i 2 , let j be such that (4.3) holds. It then follows inter alia from the relevant rigidity conditions that r(E i 2 F j ) > 0 and r (E i 2 F j ) > 0. Setting i = i 1 , i 2 in (4.9) and solving for q(E i 1 ) and q(E i 2 ) then yields the formula
Similarly, (4.10) yields the formula
Hence if r = r, then the Bayes factor identity (3.2) holds.
Given arbitrary j 1 and j 2 , let i be such that (4.4) holds. It then follows from (4.9) and (4.10) by an argument similar to the above that
, and (4.13)
Hence if r = r, then the Bayes factor identity (3.3) holds. 
Remark 4.2.
As noted in Remark 3.4, if in the probability revision schema (3.1), r (E i ) = q(E i ) and q (F j ) = r(F j ) , then the Jeffrey independence conditions (3.15) and (3.16) imply that r = r. Interestingly, given (4.3) and (4.4), if for some i, r (E i ) = q(E i ), or for some j, q (F j ) = r(F j ), then Jeffrey independence not only fails to ensure that r = r, but actually ensures that r = r. This follows from Theorem 4.1 and the easily verified fact that (3.15) and (3.16), along with (3.2) and (3.3), imply that r (E i ) = q(E i ) and q (F j ) = r(F j ) . In particular, the p-independence of E and F, since it implies both (4.3) and (4.4) and (as noted in Remark 3.4 above) Jeffrey independence, also ensures that r = r unless r (E i ) = q(E i ) and q (F j ) = r(F j ) .
Remark 4.3. Diaconis and Zabell (1982)
proved for E and F finite that in the special case of (3.1) represented by (2.7) Jeffrey independence is necessary for r = r. In view of Theorem 3.2, this result is a corollary of Theorem 4.1.
Sequential Probability Kinematics: All is Cool
That r may fail to coincide with r in the probability-kinematical revision schema (2.7) has been cause for concern among several commentators (see Lange 2000 for some sample quotations). Their concern appears to be based on implicit acceptance of two principles relating to the general revision schema (3.1), reproduced below:
I. If what is learned from the experience prompting the revisions of p to q, and of q to r , is the same, and if what is learned from the experience prompting the revisions of q to r, and of p to q , is the same, then it ought to be the case that r = r.
II. Identical learning underlying the revisions of p to q and of q to r ought to be reflected in the posterior probability identities
for all i, (5.1) and identical learning underlying the revisions of q to r and of p to q in the identities
The first of these principles is unexceptionable. To paraphrase van Fraassen (1989), two persons who undergo identical learning experiences on the same day, but in a different order, ought to agree in the evening if they had exactly the same opinions in the morning. But the second principle is mistaken, losing sight of the fact that posterior probabilities assigned to events in the families E and F are based on the total evidence, old as well as new, and thus incorporate elements of the relevant priors. What we need is a numerical representation of what is learned from new evidence alone, with prior probabilities factored out. It is a staple of Bayesianism that ratios of new-to-old odds furnish the correct representation of the desired type (Good, 1950 (Good, , 1983 Jeffrey 2000) . 7 Accordingly, Principle II needs to be modified by replacing (5.1) and (5.2), respectively, by the Bayes factor identities (3.2) and (3.3). So modified, Principle II is both sufficient (Theorem 3.1), and in a substantial number of cases, necessary (Theorem 4.1) for the satisfaction of Principle I.
Remark 5.1. Field (1978) came close to our modification of Principle II, but made sensory stimulus, eo ipso, the source of Bayes factors, with identical stimuli prompting probability revisions by identical Bayes factors. A counterexample of Garber (1980) shows this physicalist view to be untenable: Imagine that you glance briefly in dim light at an object known to be blue or green, resulting in your becoming slightly more confident than you were before that the object is blue. Repeated glances producing the identical sensory stimulus will then result in your approaching certainty that the object is blue. Our formulation, in which identical learning gives rise to identical Bayes factors, is immune to Garber's counterexample. We learn nothing new from repeated glances and so all Bayes factors beyond the first are equal to one.
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Remark 5.2. If F = E in the probability revision schema (2.7), then r = q and r = q , and so it is always the case that r = r, except in the uninteresting case in which q = q. Lange (2000) has furnished a lucid example suggesting that this never involves a violation of Principle Ī since the relevent revisions are not based on identical learning. 9 Note that this claim follows from the principle that identical learning ought to be reflected in identical Bayes factors: Since q = q, either q = p or q = p. In the former case, the identity β r ,q (E i 1 : E i 2 ) = β q,p (E i 1 : E i 2 ) can not hold for all i 1 , i 2 , since r = q. In the latter, the identity β r,q (E i 1 :
Remark 5.3. Note that in Theorem 3.1 the probabilities p, q, q , r, and r are assumed to be well-defined and in place at the outset. Then r = r if the Bayes factor identities (3.2) and (3.3) hold. Suppose that only p, q, and q were in place at the outset. Does (3.2) then furnish a recipe for constructing a probability r that would be the appropriate revision of q if in the probabilistic state q one were to learn precisely what prompted the revision of p to q? And does (3.3) function analogously in the construction of a probability r? Only if, in the first instance,
and in the second,
since a probability r satisfies (3.2) if and only if
and a probability r satisfies (3.3) if and only if
But this raises an intriguing question, with which we conclude this paper. If (5.3), and hence (5.4), fails to hold, as may be the case, 11 does this mean that the learning prompting the revision of p to q (respectively, p to q ) cannot identically occur in the probabilistic state q (respectively, q)?
Notes

1.
In the standard exposition of probability kinematics the family E = {E i } is taken to be a partition of Ω, so that, in addition to pairwise disjointness of the events E i , one has E 1 ∪E 2 ∪· · · = Ω. Standardly, (e i ) is a sequence of nonnegative real numbers summing to one, and it is assumed that "zeros are not raised", i. e., that p(E i ) = 0 implies that e i = q(E i ) = 0. Finally, it is stipulated that 0 · p(A|E i ) = 0 if p(E i ) = 0, so that e i p(A|E i ) is well-defined even when p(A|E i ) isn't. Given the standard format, our family E simply comprises those E i in the partition for which e i > 0. Conversely, our format yields the standard one by associating to our family E = {E 1 , E 2 , . . . }, if it fails to be a partition, the partition {E 0 , E 1 , E 2 , . . . }, where E 0 := Ω−(E 1 ∪E 2 ∪. . . ), and setting e 0 = 0. When one deals with sequential probability-kinematical revisions in the standard format, conventions involving the values of expressions involving benign sorts of undefinedness multiply, and can easily obscure non-benign cases of undefinedness (see, especially, §4 below, where certain positivity conditions are crucial). Our format minimizes the possibility of such confusion.
Probability kinematics may arise through ordinary conditionalization. Suppose, for example, that A is the σ-algebra generated by E = {E i } along with arbitrary hypotheses H 1 , H 2 , . . . , and an event E ⊂ E i such that p(EE i ) > 0 for all i. Let A be the σ-subalgebra of A generated by E and the H i . If q comes from p by conditioning on E and for all A ∈ A and for all i, A and E are conditionally p-independent, given E i (p(A|EE i ) = p(A|E i )), then on A , q comes from p by probability kinematics on E. The whole point of probability kinematics is of course that the experience prompting revision of the probabilities of events in the family E often fails to be representable as the occurrence of an event E. But it is sometimes useful, when attempting to explore certain aspects of probability kinematics, to entertain such a fictional "phenomenological event" E. At least when A is finite, this is always a formal possibility (see Diaconis and Zabell 1982 , Theorem 2.1, for the whole story).
2. This is an exceedingly important point. As will be seen in §5 below, the mistaken apprehension that the probabilities q(E i ) are based solely on new evidence is responsible for much of the confusion surrounding the "noncommutativity" of probability kinematics.
3. Actually, Field expresses G i in the form e α i , where α i := log G i , interpreting the α i as "input parameters" associated with a given sensory stimulus. Each instance of this stimulus prompts a probability revision of the type (3.9) involving these input parameters. See Remark 5.1 in §5 for further discussion of this idea.
4.
As an illustration, let us show the equivalence of (3.11) and (3.2). The proportionality (3.1) asserts the existence of a positive constant c such that, for all i, π r ,q (E i ) = cπ q,p (E i ). Then (3.2) follows immediately from (1.3). Conversely, it follows from (3.2) with i 1 = i and i 2 = 1, along with (1.3), that, for all i, π r ,q (E i ) = cπ q,p (E i ), where c = π r ,q (E 1 )/π q,p (E 1 ).
From (4.1) it follows that p(E
, with all f j > 0, it follows from (4.1) that q (E i ) > 0 for all i. If, on the other hand, (4.2) fails to hold, then by the above formula for q(F j ), there exists a j such that q(F j ) = 0. And if (4.1) fails to hold, then by the above formula for q (E i ), there exists an i such that q (E i ) = 0.
6. Suppose, for example, that a ball is chosen at random from an urn containing 9999 green balls and one blue ball, and you get to examine it fleetingly in a dim light. It would be folly to assess the probability that the ball is blue based only on your sensory impression, ignoring the composition of the urn. Indeed, unless you have solid grounds for regarding the sensory impression that your glance produces as being much more likely if the ball is blue than if it is green, your prior probability should undergo little, if any, revision. 7. Notice that several familiar measures of probability change lack the requisite feature of effacing all traces of the prior. For example, knowing nothing about p and q except, say, that q(E) − p(E) = 1/4, one can conclude that p(E) 3/4, and knowing nothing except, say, that q(E)/p(E) = 2, one can conclude that p(E) 1/2. Suppose, on the other hand, that E = {E 1 , . . . , E m } and nothing is known about p and q except that β p,q (E i : E 1 ) = β i , where (β i ) is a given sequence of positive real numbers with β 1 = 1. From this information nothing whatsoever can be inferred about p. For given any such (β i ) and any prior p with p(E i ) > 0 for all i, there exists a probability q such that β q,p (E i : E 1 ) = β i , namely, q(E i ) = β i p(E i ) / i β i p(E i ). 9. Lange speaks of experience rather than learning, but we mean the same thing by these terms, namely, considered experience (in light of ambient memory and prior probabilistic commitment), rather than the isolated sensory experience that Field saw as the source of Bayes factors. We have adopted our terminology from Jeffrey 2000 to minimize confusion with the latter sort of experience. 
p(E i F j ).
11.
Let Ω = {1, 2, . . . }, E i = {2i − 1, 2i}, and F j = {4j − 3, 4j − 2, 4j − 1, 4j} for i, j = 1, 2, . . . . Let p(2i − 1) = p(2i) = 7/2 · 8 i , let q come from p by probability kinematics on {E i } with q(E i ) = 1/2 i , and let q come from p by probability kinematics on {F j } with q (F j ) = 2/3 j . Then, since F j = E 2j−1∪ E 2j , 
